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Abstract: 
Social and temporal comparisons are two fundamental information sources for evaluating one’s 
characteristics and abilities. The current study demonstrates that when social comparison (where 
people’s performance stood in the overall distribution) and temporal comparison (whether 
performance improved or deteriorated over time) information are both provided, each 
independently influences actors’ self-evaluations of task performance and ability. In contrast, 
yoked observer participants paid virtually no attention to temporal comparison information, 
preferring to evaluate actors based solely on their status relative to others. Furthermore, when the 
feedback actors received suggested that they were getting worse, their self-evaluation ratings 
were approximately equal to that of the observers who had access to the same information. 
However, when their fortunes improved over time, actors used this temporal information as a 
basis for evaluating themselves more favorably than observers. We argue that both egocentrism 
and self-enhancement account for the differences between actors’ and observers’ performance 
evaluations. 
 
Article: 
INTRODUCTION 
Self-knowledge is served by many tributaries including feedback from behavior, other people, 
and structured tasks. Of these, behavioral feedback is arguably the most pervasive data source for 
assessing one’s characteristics, states, and status. Behavioral feedback has both temporal and 
social components. The temporal component refers to whether behavioral outcomes are 
improving or declining over time. Someone who is trying to lose weight, for example, may 
succeed and notice a reduction in body fat, or fail and witness an increase. Concurrently, the 
social component of behavioral feedback informs dieters of where they stand relative to others. 
Someone who loses weight might remain considerably heavier than his or her peers, and 
someone who gains weight might be relatively svelte in a rotund group. The former aspect of 
behavioral feedback is called temporal comparison (Albert, 1977), whereas the latter is a form of 
social comparison (Festinger, 1954). The question we address in the present study concerns how 
people evaluate themselves when they have both of these information sources at their disposal, 
that is, when they know that they have progressed or regressed over time, and when they are 
superior or inferior to others. 
 
Social comparison represents a fundamental research tradition in social psychology, extending 
back to what some consider to be the first empirical study in the field, namely, Triplett’s (1898) 
comparisons of bicycle riders’ racing times when riding alone or in a group. Social comparison 
entails thinking about other people in relation to the self for the purpose of establishing, 
maintaining, refining, or embellishing the self-concept. Many studies have shown that 
comparisons with others who are superior or inferior on the judgment dimension influence how 
people think and feel about themselves, although the consequences of comparing to worse-off or 
better-off others are complex (for reviews, see Blanton, 2001, Collins, 1996 and Mussweiler, 
2003). 
 
Compared to the hundreds of studies that fly under the social comparison banner, research on 
temporal comparison is sparse. Furthermore, most of these studies have focused on the 
consequences of thinking about past events or conjecturing about future ones rather than on 
behavioral or performance feedback. Studies on this topic have shown, for example, that thinking 
about negative past-selves is deflating (Beike & Niedenthal, 1998; Tomkins, 1987) except when 
people believe that they have changed for the better (Higgins et al., 1986 and Markman and 
McMullen, 2003). 
 
Only a few studies have examined the interplay between temporal and social comparison 
information, and none has addressed the consequences of experimentally-manipulated temporal 
and social feedback. Some studies have examined relative preferences for obtaining social and 
temporal comparison information following task performance (Levine and Greene, 
1984 and Ruble and Flett, 1988). Another line of research—on subjective well-being—suggests 
that social comparison is a better predictor of happiness than temporal comparison (Emmons and 
Diener, 1985 and Fox and Kahneman, 1992). Developmental research finds that people of all 
ages report engaging in more social than temporal comparisons (Suls, 1986). Finally, studies 
have shown that people are more likely to describe themselves using flattering temporal-past 
comparisons than social comparisons (Wilson & Ross, 2000). 
 
It seems fair to say, therefore, that we know very little about how people use social and temporal 
comparison when both data sources are available for self-evaluation. Furthermore, what we do 
know is confined to retrospective reports that are limited by the possibilities of inaccurate recall 
or by participants lacking awareness of the comparisons they routinely engage in (Mussweiler et 
al., 2004 and Stapel and Blanton, 2004). 
 
In the present study, we take a first step toward filling this gap in the social comparison 
literature. Specifically, we address how people evaluate their performance and ability on a social 
sensitivity test when both social and temporal comparison information are available. Part of the 
answer to this question seems obvious: People who improve and are better than others should 
exhibit the most favorable self-evaluations, whereas those who get worse and fare poorly relative 
to others should evaluate themselves the most negatively. The independent effects of social 
comparison information also seem straightforward and can be derived from previous research 
(Buckingham and Alicke, 2002 and Klein, 1997): People should evaluate themselves more 
favorably when they are better as opposed to worse than average. 
 
The lack of prior research makes predictions about temporal comparison information more 
difficult. In a purely logical sense, temporal comparison information would seem to have 
negligible value for self-evaluation in that temporal improvement or deterioration matters little if 
one’s position in the distribution remains constant. Most developmental skills, for example, 
improve from childhood to adulthood, but a person who is getting smarter while everyone else is 
getting smarter at the same rate has not improved on the trait dimension of “intelligence.” 
 
However, a large and growing literature on egocentrism (for a review, see Dunning, 2000) 
suggests that people are likely to be especially sensitive to temporal comparison information. 
People pay more attention to their own behaviors, outcomes and the performance criteria upon 
which they are based than they do to others’ actions and outcomes, think about them more, and 
weight them more heavily in making judgments (i.e., Kruger, 1999). To test this egocentrism 
assumption, we included observer participants in the current study who did not take the social 
sensitivity test themselves, but who had access to the actor’s increasing or decreasing 
performance as well to social comparison information regarding the actor’s performance relative 
to others. The primary response measures were actors’ and observers’ ratings of the actors’ 
overall performance and ability on the social sensitivity test. Egocentrism predicts, and we 
expected, that actors’ ratings of their performance and ability would reflect the influence of 
temporal comparison information regardless of the level of social comparison information (that 
is, actors would rate themselves more favorably when they had improved than when they had 
declined regardless of whether they were below average, average, or better than average), 
whereas observers’ ratings would be based solely on social comparison level. 
 
We also assessed whether actors’ performance and ability judgments showed evidence of self-
enhancement. Whereas egocentrism predicts a disproportionate focus on one’s temporal 
outcomes, self-enhancement refers to the particular direction of participants’ attributions. A 
purely egocentric account assumes that actors’ disproportionate focus on their temporal 
outcomes would lead them to evaluate themselves less favorably than observers when their 
outcomes were declining and more favorably when they were improving. If self-enhancement 
motives were also operating, however, actors would not focus on their declining performance 
any more than observers because this would produce even more negative self-evaluations. Actors 
would, on the other hand, capitalize on their improving outcomes as a means to evaluate 
themselves more favorably. This reasoning translates into an interaction such that actors will 
evaluate themselves more favorably than observers when their outcomes are improving, but no 
worse than observers when their outcomes are deteriorating. 
 
METHODS 
Participants and design 
Three-hundred and ten Ohio University introductory psychology students (196 female, 114 male) 
participated in exchange for course credit. Participants were randomly assigned to the cells of a 2 
(Temporal Comparison: getting better, getting worse) by 3 (Social Comparison: above average, 
average, below average) between-subjects factorial design. A third between-subjects factor 
manipulated whether participants received feedback about and evaluated themselves (i.e., actors) 
or another student (i.e., observers). 
 
 
Materials and procedure (actors) 
Actor participants were recruited for what they believed was a study of social sensitivity skills. 
The experimenter explained that a group of psychologists had developed a test to measure 
people’s ability to make accurate judgments about the feelings and characteristics of others. The 
ability to make these judgments was said to measure people’s social sensitivity. It was stated that 
socially sensitive people are generally well liked by the people around them and successful in 
people-oriented careers. The experimenter said that psychologists were interested in evaluating 
the degree of social sensitivity college students possessed and that the participants were part of a 
large group of over 200 students at their university that was scheduled to take the test. Students 
were also told that according to recent research, social sensitivity sometimes changes during the 
college years. Therefore, students were told that they would complete five different versions of 
the social sensitivity test, one every other week for 10 weeks, to chart how socially sensitive they 
were and whether their social sensitivity changed over time. 
 
A bogus social sensitivity test, similar to that used in past research (e.g., Alicke and Largo, 1995, 
Doherty and Schlenker, 1991 and Ungar, 1980) was administered to participants every other 
week for 10 weeks. Each of the five tests contained a total of 50 items divided into four sections. 
The social sensitivity tests were posted on the course website 48 h before they were to be 
collected. Participants were required to download and print the tests and turn them in to the 
experimenter at the beginning of class on the day they were due. Two to three days after each 
test was received, participants were sent individualized feedback e-mails detailing how well they 
performed on the current test, and reminding them of their scores on the previous tests. The 
feedback levels are displayed in Appendix A. Temporal comparison was manipulated by 
informing participants that the number of items they correctly identified on each of the 50-item 
social sensitivity tests either gradually improved or declined over time. Social comparison was 
manipulated by informing participants that their test performances were either consistently better 
than the average, average, or worse than the average score based on nearly 1500 previous 
participants. 
 
Once all the participants received the fifth and final feedback e-mail, a questionnaire containing 
the dependent measures was posted on the course website. This self-evaluation questionnaire 
asked participants to assess their test performance (“How well do you think you performed on 
the Social Sensitivity Tests?”) and perceived social sensitivity (“In general, how would you rate 
your Social Sensitivity?”) on 11-point scales (0 = very poorly/bad, 10 = very well/good). The 
questionnaire also included manipulation checks which asked participants to recall whether the 
number of questions they correctly answered on the social sensitivity tests improved or declined 
over time and whether their test scores were above average, average, or below average compared 
to the other students involved in the study. All questionnaires were collected by the experimenter 
at the beginning of class 2 days after they were posted on the course website. After the 
questionnaires were collected, the experimenter carefully debriefed the students to ensure them 
that the feedback they received was bogus and was unrelated to their actual level of social 
sensitivity. During debriefing, no participant expressed being unduly affected by the feedback 
they received and all participants felt that the use of negative feedback in some conditions was 
justified given the scientific importance of the research. 
 
 
Materials and procedure (observers) 
Observer participants were given a questionnaire that started with the following instructions: 
 
“In this study, you will be asked to evaluate the performance of an Introductory Psychology 
student on Social Sensitivity tests. The identity of this student will remain completely 
confidential. Social Sensitivity is the degree to which people are able to make accurate 
judgments about the thoughts and feelings of others. Recent research has found that Social 
Sensitivity can change dramatically during the college years. Therefore, we recently asked 
Introductory Psychology students to complete a Social Sensitivity test every other week for 10 
weeks. Upon completing each test, students were e-mailed feedback about their performance. At 
the end of the term, one student received the following e-mail indicating how well he/she 
performed on each of the five Social Sensitivity Tests.” 
 
Then, observer participants were provided a printed version of one of the eight feedback emails 
sent to the actors following the fifth and final social sensitivity test. The name of the 
corresponding student was removed for confidentiality purposes. After taking a few moments to 
review the scores, observers rated actor participants on the same scales on which the actors rated 
themselves. 
 
Results 
Data from 12 participants were excluded from the analyses because these students failed one or 
more of the manipulation checks. There was no effect of gender in any of the analyses for this 
study, F < 1; thus, we collapsed across this variable. Evaluations of performance and ability were 
aggregated to create one index of target-evaluation, r(298) = .64, p < .001. 
 
A 2 (Temporal Comparison) X 3 (Social Comparison) X 2 (Actor, Observer) ANOVA was 
conducted on target-evaluation ratings. Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1. The 
ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of temporal comparison, F(1, 286) = 6.56, p < .05, 
η2 = .02. Participants evaluated the target more favorably when the target’s performance was 
getting better (M = 5.77) as opposed to getting worse (M = 5.40). Additionally, a significant 
main effect of social comparison emerged, F(2, 286) = 24.82, p < .001, η2 = .15. Targets were 
evaluated more positively when they consistently performed above average (M = 6.12) than 
when they were average (M = 5.75) or below average (M = 4.87). A third main effect emerged 
such that actors (M = 5.74) evaluated themselves somewhat more favorably than observers 
(M = 5.44), F(1, 286) = 3.81, p = .05, η2 = .01. 
 
These main effects were qualified by a significant Temporal Comparison X Actor/Observer 
interaction, F(1, 286) = 8.50, p < .005, η2 = .03 (see Fig. 1). To explore the nature of this 
interaction, we conducted separate independent samples t tests. For the actors, temporal 
comparison exerted a significant self-evaluative impact such that participants evaluated 
themselves more favorably when they were getting better (M = 6.13) than getting worse 
(M = 5.33), t(147) = 3.78, p < .001, d = 0.62. Conversely, temporal comparison did not have a 
significant impact on target-evaluations made by observers, t < .30. Observers rated targets 
similarly regardless of whether they were getting better (M = 5.40) or worse (M = 5.47). 
Furthermore, target evaluations and self-evaluations did not diverge in the getting worse 
conditions, t < .60. However, in the getting better conditions, actors evaluated themselves 
significantly more favorably than observers, t(152) = 3.55, p = .001, d = 0.58. 
 
 
Table 1: Target-evaluations following temporal and social comparison 
 Temporal comparison 
 Actors  Observers 
Social comparison Worse Better  Worse Better 
Below average  
M 4.65 5.46  4.57 4.76 
SD 1.20 1.27  1.26 1.30 
N 23 25  23 25 
Average  
M 5.56 6.37  5.72 5.35 
SD 1.13 1.02  1.67 1.18 
N 25 27  25 27 
Above average  
M 5.73 6.54  6.08 6.10 
SD 1.54 1.16  1.32 1.15 
N 24 25  24 25 
 
 
Figure 1: Actors’ and observers’ mean target-evaluations as a function of temporal comparison. 
 
 
The Actor/Observer X Social Comparison interaction was nonsignificant (F < 1). Similarly, the 
Temporal Comparison X Social Comparison X Actor/Observer three-way interaction was non-
significant (F < 1). 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Social and temporal comparison information are two of the most fundamental information 
sources upon which the self-concept is constructed. These comparison types can be likened to 
the consensus and distinctiveness dimensions in classic attribution theory (Kelley, 
1967 and Kelley, 1973), the only difference being that social comparison theory addresses self-
evaluation, whereas attribution theory typically examines social evaluation. Whereas consensus 
compares an actor’s behavior or outcomes to those that others experience, distinctiveness places 
the actor’s present behavior or outcomes in the context of his or her previous ones. Social and 
temporal comparisons provide identical information, which suggests that theorists working in 
different research areas believe that these information categories are the basic building blocks of 
self and social perception. 
 
The current study demonstrates that when social and temporal comparison are both provided, 
each independently influences students’ evaluations of their task-related performance and skill, 
in this case, a task that purported to measure social sensitivity. Historically, social comparison 
information has been manipulated by exposing participants to the performance outcomes of one 
or more other people. However, information about one’s position in larger distributions is also an 
important form of social comparison (Buckingham and Alicke, 2002 and Klein, 1997), and the 
current study confirms that participants use this information to evaluate their performance and 
skill. 
 
The findings for temporal comparison are more novel. This is the first study we are aware of to 
assess the self-evaluative consequences of manipulated temporal and social comparison 
information. The findings showed that temporal comparison information influenced self-
evaluations at each level of social comparison. Thus, regardless of whether participants believed 
that they were below average, average, or above average, the fact that they were improving or 
regressing influenced their perceptions of their overall performance and social sensitivity skill. 
Because the response measures asked participants to rate their performance on the tests as a 
whole, as well as their overall social sensitivity ability, one could argue that temporal 
information was normatively insignificant and should have been ignored. We have argued that 
the tendency to focus egocentrically on one’s own behaviors and outcomes accounts for this 
effect. An alternative explanation involves the way participants construe performance and skill: 
Perhaps they incorporate getting better or getting worse in their definition of what it means to 
perform well and possess ability. 
 
Comparisons with observers suggest that construals of performance and skill are not the whole 
explanation. In contrast to actors, observers paid virtually no attention to temporal comparison 
information, preferring to evaluate actors based solely on their status relative to others. Unless 
observers for some reason interpreted the response measures differently from actors, this 
difference suggests that actors’ evaluations do not seem simply to reflect the way they construe 
performance and skill. Rather, actors’ self-evaluations appear to be consistent with an egocentric 
explanation which assumes that they focus disproportionately on their own outcomes and 
experiences, even when more diagnostic data are available upon which to base their judgments. 
 
The plot thickens when considering the differences between actors’ and observers’ evaluations in 
the improving and declining temporal conditions. When the feedback actors received over the 
five sessions suggested that they were getting consistently worse at the social sensitivity task, 
their ratings of their performance and ability were approximately equal to that of the observers 
who had access to the same information about declining performance. In this case, actors did not 
focus unduly on their declining outcomes, but, like observers, relied primarily on social 
comparison information regarding their performance relative to others (below average, average, 
or above average) for self-assessment. However, when their fortunes improved over the five 
sessions, actors used this temporal information as a basis for evaluating themselves more 
favorably than observers. Thus, in addition to being egocentric in their overall focus on temporal 
outcomes, actors exhibited evidence of egoism in capitalizing on improved performance to 
elevate their self-evaluations. 
 
An alternative explanation for our actor–observer differences is that temporal comparison 
influenced evaluations made by actors, but not observers, because actors received temporal 
information over the course of ten weeks, whereas observers received it all at one time. 
However, observers’ and actors’ evaluations were very similar at all levels of social and 
temporal comparison information, varying only in the conditions in which actors learned that 
their performance was improving. Thus, observers generally seemed to use temporal information 
in the same way as actors, except when the information could be used to the actors’ advantage. 
Furthermore, even if observers’ use of temporal information was somewhat depressed across the 
board, the more important part of the interaction pattern, showing that actors used temporal 
information when it indicated improvement but not when it indicated decline, still obtains. 
 
Another possible explanation for these actor–observer differences in the use of temporal 
information is that actors spent time in-between testing sessions gathering evidence for or against 
the social sensitivity test feedback they received. Because people are more likely to receive 
positive than negative social feedback (Shrauger & Schoeneman, 1979), actors might have 
received more support for positive than negative temporal comparison information during the 10-
week time period. One might expect, however, that if participants were using positive daily 
experiences to discount negative temporal information, they would have also used positive daily 
experience to discount negative social comparison information, and yet this did not occur. 
 
Furthermore, it seems somewhat doubtful that participants spent a great deal of time discussing 
their performance on a fairly arcane test with their friends. Careful consideration of the feedback 
levels would have revealed to participants that the temporal information was essentially 
meaningless in that participants were improving or declining at the same rate as everyone else. 
Thus, if actors were using the extra time to analyze more thoroughly the feedback they received, 
one would expect minimal temporal comparison effects rather than the significant temporal 
comparison effects that actors actually displayed. 
 
An important avenue for future research will be to see whether the self-evaluative effects of 
temporal comparison vary as a function of the judgment domain. People have implicit theories 
about the degree to which particular traits and abilities are fixed versus changeable (Chiu, Hong, 
& Dweck, 1997). The impact of temporal improvement or decline may be weaker for domains 
that are considered fixed rather than changeable. Similarly, trait controllability may be an 
important moderator of temporal comparison effects. If people feel that they are personally 
responsible for changes in their traits or abilities over time, then these temporal trends may 
impact self-assessments. Yet if temporal changes are perceived as due to chance, or 
environmental circumstances outside of one’s personal control, then these changes are unlikely 
to yield self-evaluative effects. 
 
While temporal comparison feedback impacted the self-evaluations of participants in our college 
student sample, it is possible that older adults are less likely to be influenced by temporal 
comparisons. Despite declining health, older adults continue to show high levels of subjective 
well-being (Diener & Diener, 1996). One possible explanation for this phenomenon is that older 
adults focus more on social comparisons with other people the same age as them than temporal 
comparisons with better-off past selves. 
 
In the current study, we focused on the relative impact of temporal and social comparison 
information on self-evaluations. In future research, it would be useful to study other possible 
outcomes of social and temporal comparison information such as mood, performance level and 
persistence, and predictions of future performance and ability. 
 
Finally, we held social comparison level constant in this study while varying temporal 
comparison. Thus, regardless of whether participants were getting better, staying the same, or 
getting worse, their position relative to others (above average, average, below average) remained 
constant. Temporal improvement (or decline) may have a greater self-evaluative impact when it 
is coupled with gains (or losses) in social status. A natural extension for future research, 
therefore, is to vary both comparison aspects simultaneously, although this will require a fairly 
large experimental design. Nevertheless, it will be interesting to learn, for example, whether 
temporal information remains influential when it works in contrast to social comparison; that is, 
when people’s performance steadily increases but their social standing continually declines, or 
when their performance steadily declines but their social standing actually increases. 
 
Appendix A: Social and temporal comparison feedback levels 
 Test 1 Test 2 Test 3 Test 4 Test 5 
Better, Above Average 
Target’s scores 24 28 30 33 38 
Average scores 18 23 25 27 32 
 Better, Average 
Target’s scores 24 28 30 33 38 
Average scores 24 27 31 35 38 
 Better, Below Average 
Target’s scores 24 28 30 33 38 
Average scores 30 33 35 39 44 
 Worse, Above Average 
Target’s scores 38 33 30 28 24 
Average scores 32 27 25 23 18 
 Worse, Average 
Target’s scores 38 33 30 28 24 
Average scores 38 35 31 27 24 
 Worse, Above Average 
Target’s scores 38 33 30 28 24 
Average scores 44 39 35 33 30 
Note. Scores were out of 50 total questions. 
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